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USE OF SECTION 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT IN CONGLOMERATE
MERGER CASES
by William F. Lemke, Jr.*
In the past, the principal challenges to mergers and acquisitions
have been made through use of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act' or Section 7 of the Clayton Act.2 It is apparent that
these statutory provisions will be utilized in current proceedings against
conglomerate mergers or acquisitions.3 Assistant Attorney General
Richard W. McLaren is reported to have stated that Section 7 of
the Clayton Act should be further tested against conglomerates before
determining whether new legislation is needed. 4
There is another federal statute which may be available to comple-
ment or supplement Sherman and Clayton in conglomerate merger
cases. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits use
of "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce . ... 5 Although it is not one
of those statutes which are designated as "antitrust laws" by Section 1
of the Clayton Act,6 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act has frequently been used against practices similar to those which
have been found to be in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
laws. Accordingly, Section 5 is available for use in support of, or per-
haps in extension of, the policies of the antitrust laws.
To what extent is the Federal Trade Commission authorized under
* Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964). Section 1 declares contracts, conspiracies and com-
binations in restraint of trade to be illegal. Section 2 prohibits monopolizing, attempting
to monopolize and combining or conspiring to monopolize.
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). This section prohibits the acquisition of all or part of
the assets or all or part of the stock of one corporation by another corporation where
the effect of the acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.
3 See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13320 (D. Conn.,
filed Aug. 1, 1969); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13319
(D. Conn., filed Aug. 1, 1969); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., Civil No.
69-C-1102 (N.D. Ill., filed May 21, 1969); United States v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., Civil No. 69-C-924 (N.D. Ill., filed April 28, 1969); United States v. Ling-
Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed April 14, 1969).
4 Wall St. Jour., Jan. 30, 1969, at 8, col. 2.
5 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
6 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
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Section 5 to enforce antitrust restraints? In FTC v. Gratz,7 the United
States Supreme Court considered the applicability of Section 5 to a
tying arrangement. The Court held that the arrangement did not
violate the Act stating that the words, "unfair methods of competi-
tion, [were] inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as op-
posed to good morals because characterized by deception, bad faith,
fraud or oppression, or against public policy because of their dan-
gerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly."
The Gratz court also held the ultimate decision whether a given prac-
tice was, as a matter of law, an unfair method of competition should
be made by the courts.
The restrictive position taken in Gratz in its interpretation of
unfair methods of competition was eventually repudiated in FTC v. R.
F. Keppel & Bros. Inc.9 There the Court held the words "unfair
methods of competition" were not intended by Congress to be limited
to "fixed and unyielding categories." Rather, they established a flexi-
ble standard which might be applied to future practices unknown at the
time the statute was enacted. The Court said that "[n]ew or differ-
ent practices must be considered as they arise in the light of the circum-
stances in which they are employed."' 10 Keppel reaffirmed the Gratz
ruling that the issue of whether a given practice is prohibited should
be for the courts to determine.
I. ORGANIZATION OF ANTITRUST CASES
Since Keppel, the Court has continued to be flexible in its interpre-
tation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in deceptive
practice," restraint of trade and other antitrust cases. 12  In the re-
straint of trade or antitrust area it is suggested that the cases may be
grouped into three broad categories.
Violation of the antitrust laws is a violation of Section 5. The pro-
visions of the antitrust laws constitute statements of public policy which
the courts may use as a standard in making determinations whether un-
fair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 have been utilized.
In Fashion Originators Guild of America v. FTC,13 the Supreme
7 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
8 Id. at 427.
9 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
10 Id. at 306-10, 314.
11 See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
12 See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
'3 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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Court stated: "If the purpose and practice of the combination of gar-
ment manufacturers and their affiliates runs counter to the public pol-
icy declared in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Federal Trade Com-
mission has the power to suppress it as an unfair method of competi-
tion.
14
Practices which contravene the "spirit" of the antitrust laws, but
are exempt because of technical or jurisdictional omissions are viola-
tions of Section 5. This category of cases is best illustrated by The
Grand Union Co. v. FTC15 where the Commission applied Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act to a practice not specifically
covered by Section 2 of the Clayton Act.16 Section 2 of the Clayton
Act makes it illegal for a seller to pay advertising allowances to his
competing customers unless it is done on a proportionally equal basis, 17
but does not make it correspondingly illegal for a buyer to know-
ingly induce and receive such allowances. Noting that the Robinson-
Patman Act did apply buyer liability in cases where illegal discrimina-
tions in price were knowingly induced or received,18 the Commis-
sion sought to remedy a possible oversight in the statute by charging a
buyer who had received discriminatory advertising allowances with
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.19 In
its opinion upholding the Commission the court said:
The Commission is not upsetting specific Congressional policies; the
proceedings did not 'circumvent the essential criteria of illegality pre-
scribed by the express prohibitions of the Clayton Act.' 20 ...
Jurisdiction, perhaps, has been expanded from the technical confines of
§ 2(d), but only fully to realize the basic policy of the Robinson-
Patman Act, which was to prevent the abuse of buying power.
The Commission's decision here is entirely consistent with the basic
purpose and policy of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
14 Id. at 463. See also FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co. 344 U.S.
392 (1953).
15 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). See also FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341
(1968); R.H. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); American News Co.
v. FrC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
10 Clayton Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(f) (1964). 15 U.S.C. §§ 13,
13a-13c, 21a are popularly known as the Robinson-Patman Act.
17 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964).
18 Id. at § 13(f).
19 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964). Sellers who paid the discriminatory advertising
allowances had already been found to have violated 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964). Swanee
Paper Corp. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
20 Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 98 n.17 (2d Cir. 1962): "See Report of
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, March 31,
1955, 149 n.78."
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That section did not define 'unfair competition'; the concept was left
flexible, so that the Commission could apply the broad Congressional
standard to the myriad fact situations which would arise.
21
Practices not within the ambit of the antitrust laws may violate
Section 5. The Sherman Act is regarded as the basic antitrust law.
The Clayton Act is sometimes said to have been intended to nip in-
cipient antitrust violations in the bud before they blossom into Sher-
man Act violations. 2 Section 5 is broader because action which
runs counter to the public policy declared in the acts constitutes a vio-
lation of Section 5. In a number of cases the courts have held or in-
dicated that Section 5 applies to situations where neither the Sherman
Act nor Clayton Act tests were met.
In FTC v. Cement Institute,23 a case involving use of a basing
point pricing system, the Court had the following to say about Section
5:
Far from 'being regarded as a rival of the Justice Department and the
district courts in dissolving combinations in restraint of trade, the new
Commission was envisioned as an aid to them. . . .All of the com-
mittee reports and the statements of those in charge of the Trade Com-
mission Act reveal an abiding purpose to vest both the Commission and
the courts with adequate powers to hit at every trade practice, then
existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained competition or might
lead to such restraint if not stopped in its incipient stages .... 24
In Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC25 the Court remarked:
As our cases hold, all that is necessary in Section 5 proceedings to find
a violation is to discover conduct that 'runs counter to the public policy'
declared in the Act. Fashion Originators Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941). But this is of necessity, and was
intended to be, a standard to which the Commission would give sub-
stance. In doing so, its use as a guideline of recognized violations of
the antitrust laws was, we believe, entirely appropriate. It has long been
recognized that there are many unfair methods of competition that do
not assume the proportions of antitrust violations. (Citations om-
mitted) .26
In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 7 a shoe manufacturer had fran-
21 300 F.2d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1962).
22 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962); United States
v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957).
23 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
24 Id. at 692-93.
25 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
26 Id. at 369.
27 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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chise agreements with retailers requiring them to concentrate their
business in certain grade and price levels and not to handle shoes of
competitors. In holding there was a Section 5 violation the Court
declared:
[I]t is now recognized in line with the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Gratz that the Commission has broad powers to declare trade practices
unfair. This broad power of the Commission is particularly well estab-
lished with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic
policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices
may not actually violate these laws. 28
[O]ur cases hold that the Commission has power under § 5 to arrest
trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount
to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions
of the antitrust laws.
29
The FTC has recently embarked on a policy of merger prosecution
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commis-
sion, armed with the broad interpretation given Section 5 by the courts,
has issued complaints attacking several recent mergers. These com-
plaints call for an extension of the classifications and theories of the
precedent from which they flow. This recent history portends of what
may become vigorous antitrust enforcement under Section 5. 30
A. Violation of the antitrust laws is a violation of Section 5.
The Commission determined this matter to its satisfaction in Foremost
Dairies, Inc.3 1 where it overruled a hearing examiner's holding that merg-
ers and acquisitions could be considered by the Commission only
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Commission decided facts
indicating a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act could also
indicate a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The Commission went on to state that practices not technically within
the reach of the Clayton Act might nevertheless constitute a viola-
tion of Section 5.
28 Id. at 320-21.
29 Id. at 322. See also FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Virginia Excel-
sior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389
F.2d 847 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968). But see Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), where both dissenting opinions
suggest that Section 5 of the FTC Act might prohibit a practice which was not pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act.
30 Classification is undertaken with the realization that some proceedings may fall
into more than one category and that there may be honest differences of opinion con-
cerning the category into which any given proceeding should most appropriately be
grouped.
31 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962).
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In Golden Grain Macaroni Company82 the complaint charged only
a violation of Section 5. It was alleged the respondent had made
several acquisitions which substantially lessened competition in the rele-
vant market. Respondent was also charged with monopolizing, selling
below cost, discriminating in price, engaging in price wars, and remov-
ing competitors' products from shelves of retail outlets by a buying-up
program. The hearing examiner's initial decision ordered respondent
to divest itself of one of the acquisitions. He referred to the apparent
policy of the Clayton Act against increasing economic concentration
and held there was an unfair method' of competition in violation of
Section 5.33
In The Stanley Works,34 a complaint has been issued charging
violations of both Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.35 The merger of Stanley, one of the
nation's leading producers of a full line of hardware, with Amerock
Corp., a dominant producer of cabinet and furniture hardware, was al-
leged to have created an unreasonable restraint of trade and a danger-
ous tendency to unduly hinder competition thereby violating Section 5
in the following respects: a) elimination or possible elimination of sub-
stantial actual or potential competition; b) substituting the more power-
ful Stanley for the Amerock units in the industry thereby increasing
entry barriers and depriving smaller concerns of equal opportunity to
compete; c) denying free and open competition; and d) accelerating an
increasing level of concentration.
B. Section 5 used to remedy jurisdictional deficiencies, etc.
The Federal Trade Commission has, on a number of occasions, re-
lied upon Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in merger
cases where for jurisdictional reasons or form of business organization
Section 7 of the Clayton Act did not apply. This is analogous to the
Justice Department's use of Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act in such
situations. 36  A major distinction is that Section 5 does not re-
32 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17,961 (FTC 1967).
33 3 TRADE REG. REP. ff 18,768 (FTC 1969).
34 3 TRADE REG. REP. f 18,338 (FTC 1968).
35 See also Allied Chem. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,496 (FTC 1968) (alleging
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Comm'ssion Act and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act); Freuhauf Trailer Co. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
17,260 (FTC 1965) (alleging violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act); L.G.
Balfour Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,485 (FTC 1968) (alleging violation of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
36 See United States v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
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quire as high a level of restraint on competition as do the Sherman Act
provisions.
37
In Beatrice Foods Company,38 the respondent was alleged to have
acquired 175 independent dairy companies and to have become the
third largest dairy company in the United States. It was charged
with violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Many of the acquired dairies were
not corporations and may not have been engaged in interstate com-
merce. "9 In its opinion the Commission said:
There is, however, at least one important difference in scope be-
tween Section 7 and Section 5. While Section 7 is applicable only to cor-
porate acquisitions, Section 5 expressly forbids unfair methods of com-
petition on the part of persons and partnerships as well as corporations.
Had Congress deliberately limited Section 7 to corporations, determining
that acquisitions involving persons and partnerships should not be gov-
erned by the same standards applicable to corporate acquisitions, we
would hesitate to conclude that such acquisitions are to be tested in
Section 5 proceedings under Section 7 standards. But no such Con-
gressional intent is discernable. So far as appears, Section 7 was not
made applicable to noncorporate acquisitions only because corporate
acquisitions were in the forefront of Congressional concern and at-
tention.
Applying Section 5 to noncorporate acquisitions effectuates, rather
than circumvents or conflicts with Congress' policy with respect to the
prevention of anticompetitive acquisitions.
40
The Commission recently issued a complaint against Ash Grove Ce-
ment Company41 charging violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The cement com-
pany which had acquired the capital stock of two other companies in
the industry and also acquired the assets used in a rock quarrying busi-
ness by a third company. The Commission complaint alleged the cor-
porate stock acquisitions were violations of Section 7, and the asset ac-
quisition from individuals was alleged to be a Section 5 violation. To-
gether, it was alleged, the stock and asset acquisitions were anti-coin-
87 See cases cited supra note 29.
38 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. f 17,244 (FTC 1965).
89 Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to corporations engaged in commerce which
are involved in acquisition of stock or assets of other corporations also engaged in
commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
40 Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE Ra. REP. 1 17,244, at
22,335-36 (FTC 1965).
41 3 TRADE R G. REP. f 18,849 (FTC 1969).
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petitive and tended to be monopolistic.
C. Section 5 applied to practices beyond the ambit of
antitrust laws.
In L. G. Balfour Company,42 the Commission's complaint charged
only a violation of Section 5. Various anti-competitive and mono-
polistic practices were involved including the secret acquisition of an-
other company in the industry which was held out as continuing to be
an independent competitor. The Commission found that concealing the
fact of this acquisition was an unfair method of competition which
aided the Balfour Company in maintaining and increasing its monopo-
listic position.
4 3
In Maremont Corporation,44 proceedings have been instituted by
the Commission under Sections 5 and 7. Maremont is a major re-
builder and producer of automobile replacement parts. It also owns
and operates one of the largest warehouse distribution chains in the
United States. The complaint challenges acquisitions of automotive
parts manufacturers, rebuilders and warehouse distributors. One charge
in the complaint is that:
Maremont's plan to continue making distribution acquisitions until
it has established a nationwide network of warehouse distributors con-
stitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce . . . violative of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act * * * because in light
of its acquisitions to date each and every additional distribution acquisi-
tion may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended. * : *45
It will be recalled that the Supreme Court was interpreting Section 7
of the Clayton Act in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States" when it
stated that "[iut is true, of course, that the statute prohibits a given merger
only if the effect of that merger may be substantially to lessen competi-
42 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 18,485 (FrC 1968).
43 See Rader v. Balfour, 1969 Trade Cas. 1 72,709 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In that case
the issue was whether the Balfour case tolled the statute of limitations in a private
suit. In discussing the distinction between FTC enforcement of a Clayton Act provision
and enforcement of Section 5 provisions, the court said:
In the case at bar, on the other hand, the FTC proceeding was not one to enforce
an 'antitrust law' as that term is specifically defined in Section 1 of the Clayton
Act; the FTC proceeding was an administrative proceeding dealing with a much
broader category of regulation than what is forbidden by the 'antitrust laws'. Id.
at 86,536.
44 3 TRADE RFG. REP. % 18,431 (FTC 1968).
45 Id. at 20,765.
40 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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tion. ' '47  The Maremont case, still at the complaint stage, challenges a
plan to continue making future acquisitions, and appears to represent
a substantial step beyond the Brown Shoe doctrine of confining the
measure of competitive impact to the specific merger under considera-
tion.
The acquisition by The Bendix Corporation of Fram Corporation
was challenged by the Commission in a complaint charging violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.48 The acquisition was a conglomerate type product exten-
sion merger in which Bendix, a major diversified manufacturer of com-
ponents and assemblies for automotive, aerospace, automation, oceanic,
scientific and other uses, acquired Fram, the nation's third largest man-
ufacturer of automotive filters and also a substantial producer of water
filter separators and aerospace fuel filters. The complaint was pat-
terned after FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. (Clorox),49 but constituted a
step beyond Procter because it was based on Section 5 as well as Section
7 and because Bendix was not as closely affiliated with, nor as likely to
have as direct a competitive impact in Fram's market as did Procter in
the Clorox market. In an initial decision, a hearing examiner dis-
missed the complaint. 50 His action is subject to Commission review
and it will be interesting to see whether the agency uses this opportu-
nity to explore the reaches of Section 5.
H. POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF EXTENDED SECTION 5 POWERS
Assuming that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is
violated by practices not having sufficient anti-competitive effect to
be violations of the Clayton or Sherman Acts, what is the potential
of Section 5 in the conglomerate field? There are some areas where
Section 5 might apply. Application must be tempered by the realiza-
tion that factual situations in conglomerate acquisitions are myriad and
that each merger will produce its own peculiar facts.
47 Id. at 332. But see Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1091 (1962), where
the Commission states:
We have previously rejected the argument under Section 7 that certain acquisitions
in a series of acquisitions, none of which can be shown to have the adverse effect
on competition required by Section 7, become illegal and may be ordered divested
for the reason that the cumulative effect on competition of these prior mergers
may be such as to make any further acquisition illegal. On the other hand,
we have no doubt that where, as here, a respondent with a proclivity for growth
by acquisitions is charged with a violation of Section 5, the cumulative effect of all
of its acquisitions is of importance.
48 Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 17,997 (FTC 1967).
40 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
"0 Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,896 (FTC 1969).
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The Commission has the burden of demonstrating the existence of
"unfair methods of competition", in Section 5 cases. One standard
for determining this was provided by Gratz', where the Supreme Court
said to constitute unfair methods of competition the practices must be
"against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly
to hinder competition or create monopoly."'52
In United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,53 the Supreme Court said that
"the basic purpose of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act was to prevent
economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large
number of small competitors in business. '54 Does this statement regard-
ing Section 7 of the Clayton Act establish a public policy standard which
the Commission may use as a guideline in Section 5 cases? Arguably, if
a major conglomerate acquires a medium-sized company in an industry
where the conglomerate is not previously represented, this would be con-
trary to the Von's statement of public policy. Any increase in size of a
conglomerate might be regarded as an increase in concentration unless
the conglomerate simultaneously divests itself of a subsidiary or division
it already owns.55 Likewise, any conglomerate acquisition of a small
company reduces by one the number of small independent competitors
in business.
In Procter and Gamble,56 the acquirer was a large corporation and
the acquired company (Clorox) was the dominant company in the
bleach industry. In holding the merger illegal the Court found that
Clorox would be aided by the advertising and promotional power
of Procter, thus increasing Clorox' domination of the bleach industry.
Had the acquired company not been a dominant factor in its indus-
try, the unfair methods of competition standards of Section 5 might be
met even though there may not be a violation of Section 7 . 7
In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.18 the intention to use and the
actual use of reciprocity to benefit the acquired company was accepted
51 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
52 Id. at 427.
53 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
54 Id. at 275.
55 Assistant Attorney General Donald F. Turner in a statement before the Senate
Small Business Committee, on April 6, 1967 stated: "For example, . . . Congress
could pass a statute that would say to the top 50 or 100 companies 'anytime you make
an acquisition in excess of a certain size you must peel off assets of comparable magni-
tude.'" BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 300, at 11 (Apr. 11, 1967).
56 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
57 Cf. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13320 (D. Conn.
filed Aug. 1, 1969).
58 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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as evidence showing a reasonable probability of substantial lessening of
competition as required by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In later
conglomerate cases, the question has been raised whether the existence
of an economic structure which might make reciprocity possible is
enough, in the absence of any actual use of reciprocity or any plan to
use it, to establish a probable violation of Section 7V9 The lower courts
have divided on this issue.60 When the question is decided by the
Supreme Court, the Justices could use Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act in preference to Section 7 of the Clayton Act on the
theory of the dissent in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corporation6 which suggested that a practice not amounting to a Sher-
man Act violation might be an unfair method of competition under
Section 5.
Access to new financial resources are often an important factor in
conglomerate mergers. The resources may be those of the acquiring
corporation which would become available to the acquired company
giving the latter a possible competitive advantage over the remaining
companies in its industry. 2 Or the resources may be those of the
acquired company which might become available to other divisions of
the conglomerate in need of financial support.03 In either situation,
the existence of a "deep pocket" which could be drawn upon provides
economic power that did not exist before the merger was consum-
mated.64
Possession of dominant economic power plus use of such power on
one market to curtail competition in another market was held to vio-
late Section 5 in Atlantic Refining Company v. FTC.65 This case was
followed by FTC v. Texaco, Inc.66 where the court found a major oil
company's dominant economic power over its filling station dealers, al-
59 See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13320 (D. Conn.
filed Aug. 1, 1969).
60 Compare Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506
(3d Cir. 1969), and United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963),
with United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969), and
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13320 (D. Conn. filed Aug.
1, 1969).
61 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 at 520
(1969).
62 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
63 See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13320 (D. Conn.
filed Aug. 1, 1969).
64 Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
65 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
66 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
1970]
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
though not used in a coercive fashion, was nevertheless effective in con-
trolling their purchases of automotive accessories. In Fortner7 the Su-
preme Court recognized the importance of financing when it held that
special or unique financing which was not generally advisable might be
used as a tying device. It may be significant that the two dissenting
opinions in this case could not agree whether there was a Sherman Act
violation but each suggested the situation might be dealt with under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
In Maremont8 the Commission has alleged a series of horizontal
and vertical mergers violative of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and that
disclosed plans of the acquiring company to continue to make acquisi-
tions violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Using
the same theory, the Commission could use Section 5 to challenge con-
glomerates which have already made numerous acquisitions and have
plans to continue making conglomerate mergers in the future.
Is it unfair for a large multi-industry conglomerate to merge into
an industry which has been characterized by single industry concerns?
Is it unfair to introduce a large conglomerate which has a well known
public relations "image" into an industry consisting of companies that
are unknown or little known to the public? One of the arguments
against tying contracts or reciprocity arrangements is that their use in-
troduces a foreign element into competition which causes decisions to
purchase or sell to be made for reasons other than quality, cost, serv-
ice and other factors relating to the intrinsic worth of a product.
Perhaps these same arguments may apply in cases where a conglomer-
ate brings to the product line of an acquired company an image
earned in completely different product lines and completely different
industries as well as through different quality controls. 0 The future
use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act in conglomerate
merger cases remains to be more fully explored and is limited only by
the factual situations which may be created by specific acquisitions.
II. REMEDIES
An effective remedy in merger cases is the preliminary injunction
which serves to halt an acquisition before its consummation. Even in
67 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
68 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,431 (FTC 1968).
69 See Litton Indus., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 18,729 (FTC 1968), where the FTC
alleged in the Section 7 complaint that Litton used the acquisition route as a means to




cases where the preliminary injunction is denied, the denial can be
granted on condition that the acquired company is operated separately
until the litigation reaches final determination.70 Hold separate orders
eliminate the problem of "scrambled assets" before a final ruling on a
merger's legality.
The Federal Trade Commission Act does not grant preliminary in-
junction authority to the Commission-a serious limitation on the Com-
mission's remedial powers. This limitation has been alleviated to some
extent by the holding that the All Writs Act7 ' can be used if the
Commission can convince a federal appellate court that it is neces-
sary to maintain the status quo and to preserve the court's jurisdic-
tion if it were called upon to review the Commission's action.72 In
some cases, without resorting to the All Writs Act, the Commission
has been able to obtain agreement from the respondent to hold the
acquiring and acquired companies separate pending the outcome of
Commission merger proceedings.73
Violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is not a
violation of an antitrust law.74  Consequently, the private suit advan-
tages granted by the Clayton Act do not result from violation of Section
5. 75  In early cases it was held that the Federal Trade Commission
did not have authority to order divestiture of assets even in Section 7
violations.76 Since the amendment to Section 7 in 1950, the Com-
mission's power to order divestiture in Clayton Act cases has been
recognized and utilized. 77  The Commission has also ordered dives-
titure in cases brought only under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. This remedy has been used in those instances where
it was apparent that the only way to restore competition was to re-
establish the acquired company as an independent competitive entity.
78
There are a number of remedial devices available to the Commis-
sion which are more flexible than those available to the courts and
therefore perhaps more useful in disposing of complex conglomerate
70 See United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. II1. 1969).
71 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
72 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
73 See, e.g., A.G. Spaulding & Bros. Inc., 1 TRADE REG. REP. 1 4360.05 (FTC 1966).
74 Clayton Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
7; Rader v. Balfour, 1969 Trade Cas. f 72,709 (N.D. Ill. 1968). See also Y & Y
Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
76 See, e.g., FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
77 See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966); Luria Bros. & Co. v. FTC, 389
F.2d 847 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 829 (1968).
78 See L.G. Balfour Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,485 (FTC 1968).
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merger cases. One of these is the use of administrative discretion as
authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act.70 In Chesebrough-
Pond's, Inc. 0 the Commission stated:
Section 5 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes agencies,
including the Commission, '. . . in its sound discretion, with like effect
as in the case of other orders to issue a declaratory order to terminate
a controversy or remove uncertainty.' The Commission's action in
these cases is an exercise of this authorized discretion. Although we
are not issuing an injunctive order, we have found that certain practices
are unlawful, relying upon respondents' advance assurances that these
declaratory findings will be looked upon by them as a binding guide
to future conduct. A cease and desist order is not always, and in all
circumstances, the most appropriate and effective disposition of a pro-
ceeding where the primary need is to define and declare the requirements
of the law.81
Another remedial device is the Assurance of Voluntary Discontinu-
ance"2 which the Commission uses to terminate alleged violations with-
out formal proceedings if the proposed respondent will give assur-
ances that he will discontinue and not resume a questioned practice.
These assurances have been used in restraint of trade cases.83
Still another remedial device is the Advisory Opinion.84 In appro-
priate cases, if a request is made before a contemplated acquisition
is consummated, the Commission will give the requesting party an ad-
visory opinion expressing the Commission's views as to the legality
of the acquisition.8" Digests of advisory opinions are published at ir-
regular intervals. If these published opinions are expanded beyond
their current rather cryptic form, they have the potentiality of becom-
ing valuable guidelines in merger cases. A somewhat similar device is
the Trade Regulation Rule 8 which can be used by the Commission to
make advance findings that certain practices will be regarded as ille.
gal and that the Trade Regulation Rule will be used against them to
the extent it is applicable.
There have been many unsuccessful attempts to persuade Congress
to enact legislation which would require that companies planning to
79 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (Supp. IV 1969).
80 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 117,007 (FTC 1964).
81 Id. at 22,098.
82 FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1969).
83 See reference to Stephenson-Adamson Mfg. Co., FTC News Summary, July 2,
1969.
84 FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.1-1.4 (1968).
85 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,186- 18,211 (FTC 1968).
86 FTC Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1969).
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make mergers or acquisitions give advance notice to the Commission
and the Department of Justice. Recently the Commission has attempted
to obtain advance notice regarding significant mergers through use of
its statutory power to require corporations engaged in commerce to
make special reports regarding their business activities.8 7 The Com-
mission has notified companies with assets over $250 million that
special reports giving sixty days' advance notice of certain mergers or
acquisitions must be filed. Notification is also required where the
combined assets after a proposed merger would be $250 million or
more.
8 8
In complex conglomerate merger cases administrative handling by
the Federal Trade Commission may often be desirable because of the
flexibility of the remedies which are available. Coupled with this is
the agency expertise gained from dealing with many more merger cases
than the average trial court is called upon to decide.
CONCLUSION
It appears certain that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act will continue to be used in merger cases where Section 7 of the
Clayton Act would normally be applicable except for the technical
or jurisdictional deficiencies which are in that statute. It is conceiv-
able that Section 5 may also be applied in conglomerate merger cases
in such a way as to go beyond the Clayton and Sherman Acts to
reach acquisitions which would not be affected by either of these
statutes.
The commission appointed by the American Bar Association to study
the Federal Trade Commission concluded that the Commission could
perform valuable service in the antitrust field by concentrating on diffi-
cult and complex problems.8 9 One can conceive of no more difficult
problem than that of the conglomerate merger.
87 15 U.S.C. § 46 (b) (1964).
88 1 TRADE REo. REP. 1 4455 (FTC resolution of April 8, 1969).
89 ABA, REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY TM FEDERAL TRADE COm-
MISSION (1969).
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